

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN CASTLE:
CASTLE PINCKNEY

By


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
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
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"Duty is the most sublime word in our language. Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never wish to do less."

"The education of a man is never completed until he dies."

General Robert E. Lee

"We look to the future, but treasure the past..."

"... and if it doesn't work out, there'll never be any doubt that my pleasure was worth all the pain..."

Jimmy Buffett

The events that shape and direct our path in life are seldom seen by those they affect. I came to this university and this program with the desire to research the very topic this thesis is about. Before I was a preservationist, I was an Historian. The appreciation for the physical remains of history developed in me only after I opened my eyes to the historical world outside of books and the classroom.

To those that have assisted me in my journey I extend my sincere gratitude. I would like to thank Dr. Bob Weyeneth and Dr. Stephen Wise for their patience and foresight in seeing the inherent value in military history. To the State Historic Preservation Office personnel, Chad Long, Tracy Powers, Brian Collars, and Andy Chandler for their knowledge and advice regarding preservation of the built environment. To Rick Hatcher, Paul Hawke, and David Lowe, my green and grey brethren in the National Park Service who were gracious enough to share their expertise regarding military matters. To my academic colleague Steve Wells for all of his support, and especially his assistance in keeping me in touch with e-mail and other byproducts of the academic bureaucracy at USC.

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INTRODUCTION

Modern historical interpretation has long criticized the significance of Castle Pinckney in Charleston, South Carolina. This fortification, constructed between 1809 and 1810, experienced little active military role in either the War of 1812 or the Civil War. This rather "passive" existence has fostered an attitude of neglect largely as result of unfair comparison to more war-weary sites in the vicinity. The purpose of this research is to explore and analyze Castle Pinckney under criteria other than military combat with the goal to provide a more modern and complete appreciation for the importance of the structure.

To address the historic significance of Castle Pinckney the extant structure must be evaluated on an interdisciplinary level that examines issues such as the historic conditions that led to its initial construction, the men who oversaw its design and creation, the physical architecture exhibited by the site, and the unique roles it played in American history in times of war and peace.

The root of Castle Pinckney's modern stigma as a site of little importance comes from two factors. First, the early literature about the site was, as one would assume, created through military reports and dialogue. Beginning in the 1820's, America began a new and massive construction campaign of coastal defenses. This transitional stage in fortification theory and design allowed those structures already in existence to succumb to the natural biases associated with no longer being at the forefront of technological innovation. The generally accepted military opinion of Castle Pinckney as outdated and

no longer a first line of defense proliferated the general malaise for the structure that was only enhanced with its limited amount of active participation in the Civil War.

This in turn led directly into the second major factor explaining the general neglect of the structure today. Castle Pinckney is also ignored because its historical merit as a structure is largely defined by its lack of activity in combat when compared to forts Sumter and Moultrie. These two locations, on the exterior of Charleston Harbor, saw almost constant bombardment and assault between 1863 and 1865. As a result of this, other structures in the area are generally ignored due to a lack of trial-by-fire. These factors have created a historiography around Castle Pinckney that generates modern day apathy about the structure that has led to its neglect.

By evaluating a wide range of historical concepts, beyond military activity, the argument will be made that Castle Pinckney is in fact an incredibly significant historical site representing facets of the American experience rarely found anywhere else. These exceptional facets in the evolution of the American experience will be individually studied in the following proceeding sections.

The first section entitled Geography and Setting will examine the significance of its physical location and that location as a strategic position of defense prior to the formation of the American republic. Included in this will be a general description of Charleston Harbor and Shutes Folly, the small island that is home to Castle Pinckney.

The second section addresses the need for coastal defense in the American context. In order to understand the significance of Castle Pinckney, one must first understand those factors in the early American republic that led to the creation of a defense mentality centered upon coastal fortifications. This section also provides a

cursory overview to the chronology of America coastal defense construction programs and their relation to the subject of this thesis.

Section three confronts the significance of the maturing national identity and its continued move toward independence from Europe with the creation of an all American military engineering corps. This section chronicles the specific examples of European belligerency that led to the adoption of the second system of American coastal defenses and the leadership chosen to lead the new Corps of Engineers. The new techniques and theories on defense created and employed by the new Army Corps of Engineers would serve as America's first unique architectural style in the military world.

Section four on the architecture of Castle Pinckney addresses the specific tangible qualities that make the structure so unique. Whereas the previous sections focused on setting the all important historic theme behind Castle Pinckney's creation, it is here where the true specific uniqueness of Castle Pinckney's form is examined. This includes the major European theories governing fortification construction, and their alterations by American engineers for the specific environment here.

Section five briefly introduces Alexander Macomb and explains the construction of the fort under his direction. Macomb was one of the first generation of American engineers and was charged with the construction of Castle Pinckney in Charleston Harbor. In addition to being the father of Castle Pinckney, his illustrious military career would eventually culminate in the position of Commanding General of the United States Army. Through his guidance, Castle Pinckney would be completed, and the preliminary argument is put forth that Macomb's construction was the first all masonry casemated fortification erected by the United States

The next section chronicles the life of the structure as a military installation. It begins with the War of 1812 and concludes with the end of the Civil War. This section is cursory in nature simply because the few histories that have been written about Castle Pinckney have focused on the basic evolution of the structure. Despite this, events at the fort of special interest have been repeated here as supporting examples of its active role in American history.

The final sections address the life of Castle Pinckney in the post-Civil War era, after its fortification career had ended. Section seven explains the alterations and uses of the site by various government and private entities.

The summation of these sections leads to a few significant results. First, Castle Pinckney's form and strategic location point towards American technological and architectural independence from European artisans in the formative years of the early republic. Second, constructed at a time when America was not the military might we know today, Castle Pinckney's construction goes even further to signify the birth of American determination to resist the pressures of belligerent forces. Third, as an early example of a national defense plan, it reflects the expanding function of the federal government over states, as the governmental body ultimately responsible for defense. Finally, Castle Pinckney's longevity has leant it to witness events and themes that an ever diminishing number of structures can claim. These features are all amplified when one considers the level of physical integrity present of the structure. This integrity translates into a tangible expression of nationally historic themes that has seen little alteration since the actual events of historic merit occurred.

GEOGRAPHY AND SETTING

The first step to understanding the purpose and design of Castle Pinckney is to begin with its location in Charleston Harbor. The specific conditions present there not only defined the setting warranting the construction of a coastal defense, but also its eventual form.

There is a saying among Charlestonians that where the waters of the Cooper and Ashley Rivers merge in Charleston Harbor is where the Atlantic Ocean begins. Given the number and significance of historical events that those waters have witnessed, there is some merit to the audacity of this statement. At the head of the convergence, on the Cooper River side, lie the remains of an important but neglected participant to much of the national and local history associated with the area, Castle Pinckney

The harbor itself is formed by the confluence of two rivers, the Ashley and the Cooper. (Figure 1) Nestled between these mighty waters rests the peninsula that has been home to city of Charleston since 1680.¹ Early expeditions to this part of the American coast quickly identified this harbor as one of the best in the new world. In 1670 the English decided to colonize this area and placed a settlement up the Ashley River where it was perceived to be safer from Spanish and French assault.² Ten years later the population and significance of the colony had swelled sufficiently to warrant the settlement's movement down river to the peninsula where the city remains to this day.

¹ Robert Rosen, *A Short History of Charleston* (San Francisco: Lexios, 1982), 12.

² Ibid.

The interior of Charleston Harbor is a dynamic marine environment resulting from sedimentary river deposits and ocean tidal fluctuations. As a result, it is dotted with sand bars, shoals, and islands. Lying a mile off shore in the Cooper River is a marsh island known as Shutes Folly. Records of ownership of this island date back to 1711 when the land was granted to Colonel Alexander Parris. At that time the marshy island was reported to encompass 224 acres. Ownership of the island passed through several hands of the Parris family until it was sold to the island's namesake, Joseph Shute, in 1746.³ Shute sold the island in 1763, where it continued to pass through various ownerships.

Shutes Folly's spatial relationship to Charleston, and the center of the harbor, made it an ideal setting for a defensive work. A great deal of its strategic value was a direct result of the type of artillery employed in warfare at the time. Artillery in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was composed mostly of solid shot firing smoothbores. Characteristics of this artillery included low muzzle velocity, inefficient spherical shot, and relatively short range. As a result, attacking ships would have to approach close to a city in order to bombard it. In response, coastal defenses were constructed in close proximity both to use their artillery effectively, and to keep forces massed in a manner that an effective defense could be mounted.⁴ As artillery improvements progressed and ranges increased, the need for proximity diminished.

³ Kenneth Lewis and William T. Langhorne, Jr., *Castle Pinckney, an Archeological Assessment with Recommendations* (Columbia: South Carolina Institute of Archeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina, 1978), 13-14. The Shute's in Shute's Folly obviously originated with the ownership of the island by Joseph Shute. The "Folly" nomenclature is derived from the old English word "Folly" which meant a clump of fir trees on a hilltop. The word was brought over and applied by colonists to mean heavily vegetative or wooded sea islands, most likely a characteristic supported by the island when it comprised more acreage above the tidal plain.

⁴ Emanuel Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 9.

However the location of Shutes Folly continued to serve as a strategic point to control the interior of the harbor and its lines of communication.



Figure 1. Charleston Harbor map ca. 1860 showing geography and fortification emplacements. Available online from the Library of Congress at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl

During the American Revolution the island saw little use except as a terminus point for a string of eight vessels sunk to block the harbor and prevent British warships from proceeding to the interior of the harbor. Numerous secondary sources record that there was a small battery constructed by the patriots on the Shutes Folly but at the time of

the completion of this document, no primary evidence has been found to support this claim.⁵

With the cessation of hostilities in the American Revolution, interest in coastal defenses fell to the wayside of public concern. This apathy soon dissolved in the 1790s with the increased unrest in Europe. Affairs between England and France began to deteriorate and with that, English naval forces began to harass French trade on the high seas.

The resulting demand on their maritime resources compelled the French to ease their restrictions on their Caribbean colonies' trade policy. Traditionally, it had been the policy of the French government to forbid their Caribbean colonies to trade with any ships other than those flying the French flag. With the refutation of this trade monopoly, American merchantmen quickly took advantage of the opportunity and began to actively trade with the French colonies.⁶

This trade prompted the British to call out of retirement the policy forbidding neutral nations in time of war from engaging in open trade routes not previously used in peacetime. On June 8, 1793, Britain issued an Order of Council authorizing the seizure of neutral vessels carrying food cargoes to French colonies, this was later amended to include vessels carrying produce from a French colony as well.⁷ The old policy,

⁵ These sources include the archeological assessment from the South Carolina Institute of Archeology and Anthropology cited earlier in this work, and James Petit, "Out of Oblivion: The Saga of the Forgotten Fortress in Charleston Harbor," in *Castle Pinckney National Register of Historic Places Nomination*, National Park Service (Columbia: State Historic Preservation Office, 1970).

⁶ Arthur P. Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers: The Beginning of American Seacoast Fortifications, 1794-1815" (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, 1977), 7.

⁷ *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*. Vol. I, 432. 103 Hereafter cited as *ASP, FR*, with appropriate volume number and page number.

previously employed in 1756, led to the seizure of hundreds of American vessels and the incarceration or impressments of American sailors.⁸ The cries of enraged merchantmen were heard all along the coast of the United States.

The culmination of these events resulted in action by the federal government in 1794. On March 20, 1794 Congress passed legislation entitled *An Act to Provide for the Defense of Certain Port and Harbors in the United State*. This watershed act provided for the early establishment of a system of coastal defenses. It named twenty harbors along the American seaboard that required federal fortifications for defense.⁹ Charleston Harbor was one of these ports selected for the new national construction program. Located within the interior of Charleston Harbor was the small exposed sandbar known as Shutes Folly. This spot of land was selected as one of the locations for new fortification construction.¹⁰

⁸ Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 7.

⁹ *An Act to Provide for the Defense of Certain Port and Harbors, Statutes at Large*, Vol. 1, 345. Hereafter cited with title of act, *Statutes*, volume, section/part, page and year.

¹⁰ P.H. Perrault, Charleston, SC, to Secretary of War Henry Knox, June 16, 1794, *American State Papers, Military Affairs vol. 1*, 103 Hereafter cited as *ASP, MA* with appropriate volume number and page number.

THE NEED FOR COASTAL DEFENSE

With the increase of British aggression on American commerce in 1793, the national government decided to appropriate funds for a concerted defensive program. This general theme of a need to fortify the coast for defense stemmed from the lack of a large blue water naval force capable of matching the naval capabilities of the French and English. To understand the significance of Castle Pinckney, this early military doctrine advocating coastal defenses by the American government requires explanation.

Since the beginning of the use of gunpowder, artillery, and cannon, few military principles were as monolithic as superiority of guns ashore over that of guns afloat. The reliance upon wind for propulsion in the large warships of the period severely limited maneuverability, placing them at a great disadvantage when engaging fortified stationary shore positions. For these reasons, advocacy for coastal fortifications was widely endorsed by the young nation as the most logical and economical defense option. It became widely accepted that a system of defensive fortifications at each of the important harbors would be the cheapest and most pragmatic way to defend the new nation and her commerce from overseas threats.¹¹

This mentality dominated American strategy throughout most of the nation's history until the end of the nineteenth century. During this time the national programs of fortification construction can be delineated into four distinct systems, with each one

¹¹ *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Albert Bergh, vol. 3-4, *The Fifth Annual Message, December 3rd, 1805* (Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1907), 389.

exhibiting specific design characteristics and motivation. The first three systems were creatively labeled numerically based upon their chronology of adoption, hence the nomenclature first, second, and third systems. The final system of the nineteenth century was known as the Endicott System, in honor of Secretary War William Endicott who presided over the board that saw their construction.¹²

Although there were four distinct building programs, many projects overlapped and many were completed during later construction periods. For the purpose of this research, we will discuss only the first three programs with the majority of focus resting on the second system. The first two construction periods were in response to threats upon the United States by European powers and directly resulted in the construction of Castle Pinckney. The third system will be briefly mentioned because it was the largest and most expensive defensive program conducted by the United States in the nineteenth century. The design characteristics unique to works of this period stemmed from theories and practices first employed during the construction of Castle Pinckney.¹³

The first system (1794-1807) began in 1794 when Congress, reacting to an address on national defense delivered by George Washington, legislatively allocated funds and direction to the creation of a series of coastal fortifications at important cities along the Atlantic coast. The first system was actually implemented in two distinct phases, each spurred by different European belligerents. The first began in 1794 with England's aggression on the high seas and the impressments of sailors. The second began

¹² Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, 77.

¹³ Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, 31.

in 1798 in response to diplomatic difficulties with France as a result of the X,Y,Z Affair.¹⁴

The cumulative turmoil in Europe in the 1790s prompted the House of Representatives in 1794 to convene a special committee to address the issue of locations and defenses that should be erected to provide for a defense of the United States. On February 28, 1794, the committee report on the expense required to place the principle seaports and harbors of the United States was read by Thomas Fitzsimons a Representative from Pennsylvania.¹⁵ It was estimated that it would cost \$76,053.25 to erect the defensive works and another \$96,645 to cast and construct the cannon and carriages needed to arm the forts. This included a list of the recommended defended seaports which were listed as follows: Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, and Boston all in Massachusetts; Newport Rhode, Island; New London, Connecticut; New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Wilmington, North Carolina; Ocracock Inlet; Charleston, South Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia.¹⁶ Within three weeks, on March 20, 1794, the first federal authorization was passed for the construction of defenses on the United States coast.

This legislation was one of the most significant acts of the young republic in establishing the government we recognize today. The individual colonies had been responsible for their own defense under the crown. This trend continued throughout the American Revolution and on into the government established under the Articles of

¹⁴ *ASP, MA*, Vol. 1, 119.

¹⁵ *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000178>, (accessed November 12, 2006).

¹⁶ *Annals of Congress. House of Representatives, 3rd Congress, 1st Session*, 479-480.

Confederation. This policy was borne jointly out of insufficient national treasury to support the creation and propagation of a coordinated defense system, as much as it was fear of a strong federal government and military.

The 1794 legislation changed this long held precedence. It made the national government responsible for the implementation of a series of coastal defenses and just as importantly it defined that the fortifications to be erected should be garrisoned by "troops in the pay of the United States."¹⁷ This phrase clearly reflects the transition and growth of the American government and its increase in self-awareness as the body politic responsible for the citizenry as a whole.

In accordance with the March 1794 act, Secretary of War Henry Knox was responsible for finding qualified military engineers to oversee the design and construction of new fortifications. As Knox was aware, there were no native born American engineers with sufficient skill to answer the required call. There was however a supply of French military engineers displaced by the French Revolution. The vast majority of officers that had served in the Continental Army's Corps of Engineers were French. Upon learning of their presence in the country, and being familiar with their work from the Revolution, Knox set about employing former French officers as America's first military engineers. Seven men were selected and each assigned a section of coastline as temporary engineers responsible for overseeing fortification construction. Knox made it expressly clear that the men were to have no military rank serve in a short-term capacity.¹⁸

¹⁷*ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 61-62.

¹⁸*ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 101.

The man charged with fortification construction in South Carolina and Georgia was Paul Hyacinthe Perreault. He was dispatched to Charleston in February to begin plans for the fabrication of new defenses. Because Charleston was the most important sea port in the South, it was recommended by the congressional report of 1794 to be second in armament and defense only to New York. Upon reaching Charleston, discussion began between Perreault and Governor William Moultrie on the most effective sites for fortification construction. By mid-June, a consensus between the two men was achieved and four locations for defenses in Charleston were chosen. Three of the locations had served as sites for fortifications from the Revolution. They were Fort Johnson on James Island, Fort Moultrie on Sullivan's Island, and the site on Shutes Folly that had served as General Lincoln's anchor point for his submerged ships. The fourth and final work was constructed in Charleston itself and was known as Fort Mechanic.¹⁹ Due to limited amount of funds made available for the program, Knox had instructed the engineers, including Perrault, to construct the fortifications out of timber and earth in order to save funds.²⁰ This construction characteristic was one of the general features exhibited in almost all of the first system works.

Despite the agreement between federal and state governments on the location of the proposed sites, South Carolina was reluctant to cede land to the United States. It did not however have objections to using federal funds to repair and construct new works. By the end of 1795 Fort Johnson had been repaired and new foundations for Fort Moultrie and the work on Shutes Folly had been laid. After the expenditure of nearly \$20,000 in

¹⁹P.H. Perrault, Charleston, SC, to Secretary of War Henry Knox, June 16, 1794, *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 103.

²⁰Secretary of War Henry Knox to P.H. Perrault, *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 101-102.

federal money for harbor defense, work ceased because of the failure of South Carolina to resolve the land disposition issue with the national government.²¹

Construction of what would become Fort Pinckney did not begin until relation between the United States and France came to an impasse in 1798. The terms of Jay's Treaty ratified in 1795 had averted war between the United States and England but had also created a massive schism in U.S./Franco relations.²² Pushed through Congress largely by Federalist supporters, the French supportive Republicans saw the treaty as a betrayal of their Revolutionary war ally. When word reached President Washington that American ambassador to France James Monroe, a Republican, had publicly criticized Jay's treaty in France, Washington removed him from his position and replaced him with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.²³

Pinckney, a strong Federalist, was not widely supported by the French Directory in power. Dismayed at their loss of a sympathetic ambassador, the French refused to receive Pinckney. Almost simultaneously, the Directory authorized naval vessels and privateers to seize American vessels thought to be trading with Britain. To the Federalists this act seemed to violate the 1778 Franco/American commercial treaty that focused on the policy of "free ships carry free goods".²⁴

As tension continued to escalate, newly elected President John Adams opted to try once more at a peaceful solution. A special diplomatic mission headed by Charles

²¹Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 22.

²² *ASP, FR*, Vol. I, 560.

²³ *ASP, FR*, Vol. I, 559.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Cotesworth Pinckney and consisting of John Marshall and Republican Elbridge Gerry was sent to meet with the Directory.²⁵ It was hoped this bipartisan effort would succeed in reopening diplomatic relations with the French government. What resulted became known as the X,Y,Z Affair. In March 1798, the members of the mission were told that in order for the Directory to meet with them they would have to (1) pay three French delegates, codenamed in American reports as X,Y, and Z, a large cash bribe, (2) furnish the French government a large loan to aid in funding the war with England, and (3) issue a formal apology in response to remarks made by President Adams.²⁶

Americans were enraged at the notion of paying tribute in order to receive the political recognition worthy of any sovereign nation. The notorious XYZ Affair threatened to embroil the two nations in all out war. In Charleston, the citizenry was most concerned they would be vulnerable to attack from marauding French ships out of the West Indies. The funding for coastal fortification from the 1794 legislation was slow if not non-existent in reaching Charleston after the threat of an Anglo/American conflict had subsided. In response to the new French threat a community meeting was held in St. Michael's church and funds were donated by private citizens for the construction of a small log battery on Shutes Folly.²⁷ The work was named Fort Pinckney in honor of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the lead diplomat in the recent debacle, and native Charlestonian.²⁸

²⁵ *ASP, FR*, Vol. II, 19.

²⁶ *ASP, FR*, Vol. II, 158-160.

²⁷ Roger Young, "Castle Pinckney, Silent Sentinel of Charleston Harbor," *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 29 (January 1938):5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Fort Pinckney was a small battery constructed of timber and sand was thus not suitable for great longevity. The pallisaded style suffered from a weak foundation as a result of its hurried completion.²⁹ With the signing of the Treaty of Mortefontaine on September 30, 1800 the Quasi-War with France was brought to an end, as was the public interest in coastal fortifications. The works in Charleston ceased receiving maintenance and care, and quickly fell into disrepair. What remained of Forts Johnson, Pinckney, and Moultrie were finally ruined in a massive hurricane in 1804.³⁰

As the American nation developed, so too did her economy and commerce. The thriving American commercial force soon attracted the attention of the warring French and English who saw the free trade with both nations as de facto involvement in the conflict. The resulting tensions spurred the young nation to creating its first system of defenses against possible attack.

The end of the Quasi-War with France concluded the construction activity of the first system of coast defenses. What began as system designed by French military engineers, in the pay of the United States, to defend against the British navy, saw its completion only after an un-declared naval war with France commenced. This twist of irony demonstrated to the political and military leaders of the United States that a capable native born and trained corps of engineers was needed for the new nation if it were to be truly independent and self sustaining.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰*ASP, MA*, Vol. 1, 195.

THE COMING OF AN ELITE AMERICAN CORPS

One of the most significant attachments Castle Pinckney had to the evolving American identity was its lineage to the first generation of American military engineers. As a member of the second system of coastal defense construction, it reflected the first endeavors of the young professional military to safe guard the nation.

As happened so often in American military matters, once the perceived national threat from the French and English had subsided, public and political interest waned on issues of defense in favor of more peaceful and financially lucrative endeavors. This recurring theme was most evident in America's coastal defense construction policy of the early republic. Public support for constructing works occurred only when a direct belligerent threat necessitated some form of defense. In return, these hastily fabricated, situation-specific works failed to be constructed of durable material and, in calculated ways, to provide the most efficient network of defense. The conclusion of the Quasi-War did not alter this precedent. It did however illustrate the need for the United States to have a native born and trained engineering corps to oversee military matters.

The best example of this general trend away from foreign military experts was the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant Stephen Rochefontaine. Rochefontaine had served as one of Knox's initial six civilian French engineers in 1794 and was appointed by Washington to be commandant of the newly established Corps of Artillerists and Engineers in 1795.³¹ He served in this capacity until 1798 when

antagonism with France began to escalate. The issue of a foreign national from a belligerent nation holding a high ranking military position was not agreeable with the Adams' administration. On May 7, 1798 Stephen Rochefontaine was dismissed from the service of the United States Army.³²

The removal of Rochefontaine helped fuel the consideration of a professional American engineering corps. The Corps of Artillerists and Engineers had been established in 1794, but it was not until 1802 that a separate Corps of Engineers was created. The attitude under the Adams' administration that led to the dismissal of Rochefontaine only increased under the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. After his inauguration on March 4, 1801, Jefferson appointed Henry Dearborn of Massachusetts as his new Secretary of War. Dearborn in particular found the reliance upon foreign-born officers extremely distasteful.³³

Dearborn's and Jefferson's negative view of this practice, coupled with the need for technical expertise in fortification design, and artillery and small arms inspection served as a catalyst for the creation of a separate and specialized Corps of Engineers. Benefiting from efforts initiated under the Adams' presidency, the new administration began evaluating individuals with the credentials to serve in two new key positions, Inspector of Artillery and Inspector of Fortifications.³⁴

³¹ *Commanders: Portraits and Profiles*, United State Army Corps of Engineers, <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/coe.htm#4> (accessed February 12, 2007).

³² Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 75.

³³ *Ibid.*, 114.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 114-5.

For this latter position Jefferson recommended Major Jonathan Williams. (Figure 2) A contemporary of Jefferson in the American Philosophical Society, his theoretical knowledge of fortifications had greatly impressed Jefferson. Under Williams' influence, American fortification architecture would depart from traditional European styles and establish a lineage of fortification theory that would mould design and construction during the golden age of coastal defense building in the United States.



Figure 2. Jonathan Williams available online from Army Corps of engineers web page at <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/coe.htm#6>

Williams was born in Boston, Massachusetts on May 20, 1750.³⁵ He was the grandnephew of Benjamin Franklin and was in many ways the intellectual heir of Franklin. He was educated at Harvard and spent much of the period from 1770 to 1785 in France assisting Franklin.³⁶ While in France Williams did an intense study of medieval fortifications that evolved into a general fascination with the art of fortification.

³⁵*Commanders: Portraits and Profiles*, <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/coe.htm#9> (accessed October 15, 2005).

³⁶*Ibid.*

Serving in France at the same time as Williams was future president, John Adams. Their familiarity was rekindled in 1800 when Adams was searching for nominees for officers to serve in the Corps of Artillerist and Engineers. Well aware of Williams' academic familiarity with fortification theory, Adams successfully recommended him for the rank of major.³⁷

It was upon the foundational military appointment of Williams to the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers by President Adams that prompted Jefferson to elevate Williams even further. On December 14, 1801 Williams was selected to serve as the director of the soon-to-be military academy at West Point.³⁸ The following March, 1802, legislation was passed formerly creating West Point. As explained in the act passed March 16, the Corps of Engineers was the military academy.³⁹ This new professional military corps was significant to seacoast fortification because it introduced into the American military the ability to provide for itself and experiment with new fortification theories, specific to the new nation.

Throughout the first system of coastal defense construction, traditionally educated French military engineers created American fort designs along the lines advocated by French military engineer Sebastian LePrestre deVauban. Williams' most significant contribution to the art of American fortification theory was the introduction of the designs and theories of French engineer Marc Rene Marqis de Montalembert. During the time Williams spent in France he became familiar with the "circular" style of vertical

³⁷Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 110.

³⁸Ibid, 121.

³⁹Ibid, 139.

castle designed by Montalembert. Williams realized that the combination of increased firepower with less mandatory surface area were ideal attributes for coastal sentinels at the various American harbors.⁴⁰

When he returned to the United States, he brought with him a copy of Montalembert's *La Fortification Perpendiculaire*. Allegedly the first copy of this work in America, it had a great impact on American defense mentality throughout most of the nineteenth century. Through his position as superintendent of West Point and as head of the Corps of Engineers, Williams was able to propagate the theories of Montalembert throughout America's first generation of military engineers.⁴¹

Despite the removal of French engineers from the American military establishment, the principles of Vauban's style continued in this country for two key reasons. First, the sheer proliferation of his style dominated military science in the western world. Second, there was present in the minds of many American military thinkers the fear that with nothing more than a militia system to defend the coast, a foreign invader could land troops in undefended areas to assault coastal fortifications. This resulted in the continued use of Vauban principles that maximized designs effective against landward assault. Despite this latter concern, Williams decided upon actions to push forward Montalembert's theories as much as possible in order to develop fortification forms specialized for coastal defense needs.

One avenue of attack was through the United States Military Philosophy Society. Williams was a founder of this organization and it became an important outlet for the

⁴⁰ Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, 31.

⁴¹ Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 187-8.

intellectual exploration of the theories of war and the sciences associated with it. During the October 6, 1806 meeting, one of the main points of discussion was Montalembert and his theories of defensive construction.⁴² This was significant in that it brought the issues and concerns of Williams to the attention to a number of military and political personnel.

These various factors in the American military consciousness were coalescing at the precise moment that international affairs were setting the stage for their implementation. The instability in Europe that had begun with the wars of the French Revolution escalated into the Napoleonic wars. When neither England nor France could achieve decisive victories, they turned to the sea and began attacks upon the commerce of noncombatant nations with the hope of hindering trade, and thus the war effort of each other.⁴³

The intensity of the war in Europe began to escalate after 1805. This led to a change in priorities in the American government. The British escalated the practice of impressment of American sailors to supply their manpower needs in the expanding wartime navy. British naval manpower requirements had increased from roughly 36,000 men in 1792 to over 120,000 in 1805. It was estimated that the British between 1803 and 1806 had impressed 2,798 men.⁴⁴ The response from Jefferson and the Republicans was the experimental use of commercial coercion on a much greater scale than had ever been attempted. Many variations were tried including the Non-Importation Act of 1806.⁴⁵

⁴² Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 187.

⁴³ *ASP, FR*, Vol. I, 748.

⁴⁴ James Zimmerman, *Impressment of American Seamen*, (Port Washington: Kennikat Press Inc., 1966), 263.

Relations continued to deteriorate and exploded in the summer of 1807. On June 22, 1807 the United States frigate USS *Chesapeake* set sail for a cruise to the Mediterranean. Waiting off Norfolk was the British frigate HMS *Leopard* with orders to seek out the American frigate and search her for British deserters. When the two ships made contact, the *Chesapeake* heaved to and took on a lieutenant from the *Leopard*. The lieutenant carried with him two papers, one was a copy of orders to search for deserters and the second a note from the captain of the *Leopard* expressing his desire for peace to be maintained. After a period of debate in Commodore Barron's cabin aboard the *Chesapeake*, the British officer returned to his ship with word that the Americans would not cooperate. After an exchange of words through hailing trumpets, the *Leopard* fired a warning shot across the bow of the *Chesapeake* with no effect. The *Leopard* then moved into position and proceeded to bombard the American frigate with broadsides for about ten minutes. Barron surrendered and a second boarding party was sent aboard the *Chesapeake*, where the crew was mustered and four members were taken off and placed upon the *Leopard*.⁴⁶ This violation of American maritime rights in American waters and on an American warship began to propel the country toward war and instigated the construction of the second system of improved defenses along the seaboard.

The second system of coastal defense was America's first true national policy of fortification construction. The removal of the last foreign born engineer in 1802 had set the stage for the need of an all American military engineering corps capable of defending

⁴⁵Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States 1805-1812* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 113.

⁴⁶ Alfred T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812*, Vol. 1, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 155-6.

the nation.⁴⁷ The following five years witnessed the creation and evolution of the Army Corps of Engineers into a small but effective professional force capable of this task. The second system would be their first performance on the world stage of military architecture. It saw the use and experimentation with fortification design styles that deviated from the traditional rigid European models. The forms created to suit the American need for coastal defenses were the prototypes for the first military architectural contributions made by the United States to the western world.

As has been demonstrated, the emergence of a native corps of military professionals was one of the most significant tangential properties of the maturation of the nation. This fact was reflected in the built environment by the construction of distinctively American military structures, most significantly coastal fortifications. The reflection of the emerging American national identity was one of the two most significant attributes of the second system. The other was the actual architectural qualities created for, and employed in these defensive works.

⁴⁷Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 179.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF CASTLE PINCKNEY

Of the thirty-two major second system fortifications, approximately seven survive in various degrees of altered states.⁴⁸ Of these limited numbers, Castle Pinckney is one. In addition to being representative of the small collection of extant constructions of this building program, it is the singular example of a relatively unaltered masonry casemated castle type. This architectural form is significant because it served as the prototype for the subsequent generation of American fort designs.

The architectural anomalies that lend to the uniqueness of the second system can be classified into two groups, irregular traced bastioned forts and all masonry casemated fortifications, with an exceptional sub-category of casemated circular castle style fortifications.

Irregular traced bastioned forts were essentially hybridized European Vauban principles adapted for coastal defense. They retained the basic form of traditional European works by placing their armament along the parapet and employing protruding bastions to provide enfilading fire along the exterior curtain wall. This latter characteristic was essential to defend against infantry assault. The outline of Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina provides an excellent example of an irregular trace. It lacks the symmetrical shape on all faces to protect against land assault

⁴⁸ *ASP, MA*, Vol. 1, 308-311 These pages explain the number and status of second system fortifications, the approximation on the extant fortifications from this report comes from the *National Historic Landmark Nomination of Fort James Jackson, Savannah GA*, National Park Service, <http://www.cr.nps.gov/nhl/designations/samples/ga/fortjack.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2006).

in favor of maximizing its sea front for naval engagement. Only the landward side possesses bastions to defend against infantry assault.

Though most were irregular traced, fortifications in the second system were generally constructed of one of three material combinations: earthen and timber open batteries, masonry faced earthen forts and most importantly all masonry forts.⁴⁹ The open batteries constructed in the second system were constructed in a manner similar to those in the first system, using mostly parapets of dirt with wood revetments for protection and stabilization. Many of these were employed as supporting works for more significant defenses constructed using more formidable construction materials. Masonry faced earthen forts were the more numerous of the second system style. These works had earthen walls with brick or stone facing to prevent erosion and increase the longevity of the structure while at the same time reducing maintenance.⁵⁰

By far the most significant and far reaching influence of the second system was the all-masonry fort. These structures would go on to influence fortification design and construction for the next fifty years. Most significant in this design was the casemated gun emplacements possible with high walled masonry fortifications. The new design utilized arched casemates and multiple tiers of artillery to greatly increase the amount of firepower employed by a single fort, while at the same time decreasing the overall perimeter area covered by defensive walls. The multiple tiers of cannon placement effectively stacked the firepower of a fort in a manner similar to that of

⁴⁹ *ASP, MA*, Vol. 1, 308-311.

⁵⁰ Fort Moultrie once again serves as an excellent example, this time as a masonry faced earthen fort. The outer brick wall supported an infill of dirt that was faced on the interior of the fort by another brick wall.

warships of the time. This early design form was employed in circular castle style works, as prescribed by Marc Rene Marquis de Montalembert.

At the root of Castle Pinckney's design was the contrasting of military fortification designs of French origin. The previous section provided a brief introduction into these different camps. To understand the impact of the new fortification designs that arose from the distinctive American experience, it is helpful to understand the contrasting theoretical worlds from which they sprang.

From the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, the defensive philosophies of Sebastian LePrestre deVauban dominated military thinkers in France as well as the rest of the western world. Vauban served as a military engineer for Louis XIV.⁵¹ Given the nature of conflict in Europe most defensive designs were created for the purpose of fortifying overland routes of communication or logistics.

Vauban's designs used elaborate geometrically designed defensive works that provided interlocking fields of fire. By creating protruding bastions from the curtain wall of a defense, defenders in the bastion could sweep the exterior wall with enfilading fire toward the next bastion to prevent an enemy from directly assaulting the wall. By placing a bastion at each corner of a traditional enclosed four sided redoubt, the defense was made almost impenetrable to any force given an adequate number of defenders. (Figure 3)

⁵¹ Sebastian Leprestre Vauban, *A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification* (1740 original; reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968), viii.




Figure 3. The Castillo De San Marcos clearly represents this basic European premise. The prominent bastions are readily observed. Photo by Jack Boucher for HABS, National Park Service, Accessed online at <http://memory.loc.gov/pp/hhhtml/hhTitles63.html>. 11/2/05.

His design theories emphasized a “horizontal” approach to fortress design that emphasized a defense in depth approach. (Figure 4) This concept implied that parapet construction be kept low to the ground, and distance from a besieging enemy be achieved by a series of extended outer works radiating away from the main fortification. By keeping the walls of the defense low and protected behind a sloping grade of earth, known as the glacis, damage by artillery fire was kept at a minimum. Artillery of the period was composed of rather inaccurate close range smoothbores. However, the elevated walls of the medieval castles were easy targets even to the inaccurate artillery of the period.⁵² With enough time and heavy artillery, a breach of the fort walls could be affected with repetitive hits in the same location.⁵³

⁵² Ibid., 4.

⁵³ Albert Manucy, *Artillery Through the Ages* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 52.



a-b Terre-plein	g-h Berm	A Parapet
b-c Banquette slope	h-i Scarp	B Ditch
c-d Banquette tread	j-k Counterscarp	
d-e Interior slope	l-m Glacis	
e-f Superior slope	e Interior crest	a-m Plane of sight
f-g Exterior slope	f Exterior crest	

Figure 4. Side elevation of Vauban style work with Glacis. Courtesy Edmund Fitzgerald and James Hinds, *Bulwark and Bastion* (Union City, TN: Pioneer Press, 1996), 6.

It is crucial to remember that an effective assault upon permanent fortifications was only possible with very accurate (relatively speaking) and large land based siege artillery. Because of the inherent instability of the gun platform of a ship at sea, and the size limitation of the artillery that could be effectively employed from a vessel, naval gunnery of the time was neither accurate enough nor large enough to effect a breach in a stone or masonry constructed fortification. This armament deficiency coupled with the limited maneuverability inherent in the sail powered naval vessels of the time, led to the general premise that guns ashore were always superior to guns afloat.

Vauban's response to the threat of land based siege artillery was to conceal the walls of his fortifications behind earth. This protected them against assault by direct artillery fire. However this removed the defensive quality of elevation from the fortification. The walls of medieval castles were tall to make it more difficult for assaulting forces to gain entrance and to place the defenders in an elevated position from which to fire down on attackers. With this quality removed, Vauban adopted a layered defensive strategy. Beyond the bastions and connecting curtain wall, Vauban

incorporated layers of earthen defensive works extending out from the walls of the fort.⁵⁴ Troops from this vantage point provided defense of the fort walls further away and prevented an enemy from gaining the proximity required for direct assault. In this manner the fortification maintained a strategic advantage of engaging enemy forces as far away from the walls of the fort as possible. Previously this was achieved by elevating the defenders above the battlefield with high castle walls but, as a result of the adoption of artillery, defending forces were employed further out away from the fort in supporting defensive positions. From this vantage point they could work to defend the fort from besieging sappers. (Figure 5)




Figure 5. This design outlines the defensive works projecting out from the curtain walls. Courtesy HABS, National Park Service, Accessed online at <http://memory.loc.gov/pp/hhhtml/hhTitles63.html>. 11/2/05.

⁵⁴ Vauban, *Siegecraft*, 17, 46.

The side effect of this design theory was that artillery within the fort could only be placed en barbette, or along the tops of the parapet walls. This had several effects on fortification function. First, the number of guns that a fortification could now have was limited by the length of the curtain wall. To increase the number of artillery, the wall had to be lengthened. The longer the wall, the greater the distance between the bastions that provided enfilading fire to protect the curtain wall from assault by infantry. The short range smoothbore weaponry of the time dictated the distance that could separate the supporting bastions. This translated architecturally into the need for many bastions and men to provide protection for a rather limited number of artillery.⁵⁵ Taken together, these factors meant that fortifications following the Vauban style of design were severely limited in the amount of firepower they could direct against any single direction.

Many of the defensive concerns the Vauban style were designed to address were not characteristic of a sea coast harbor. First and foremost, the artillery coastal defenses were forced to contend with was much different from that found in a traditional land siege.⁵⁶ The artillery employed on naval vessels was much smaller and far less accurate. At the same time, warships of the period carried large numbers of cannon. A first rate ship-of-the line mounted between 74 and 100 guns on average.⁵⁷ An assaulting fleet thus consistently outgunned the number of artillery a Vauban-style defense could mount along its parapet. If the firepower deployed from a coastal fort could not match that of an assaulting fleet and halt their advance, then nothing was there to stop a fleet from sailing

⁵⁵Edmund Fitzgerald and James Hinds, *Bulwark and Bastion* (Union City, TN: Pioneer Press, 1996), 12.

⁵⁶Manucy, *Artillery*, 52.

⁵⁷Howard Chapelle, *The History of American Sailing Ships* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1935), 51.

past the forts and into the harbor itself. Once past the defenses, the enemy would have a strategic position within the interior lines of the defense

Second, assuming that defensive plans were properly employed, a coastal defense should not have to withstand a landward assault. Technology of the time did not readily permit the amphibious landing of large numbers of troops from ships. This was one of the salient reasons harbors were held in such high regard. For an enemy to disembark a large number of troops for an invasion, developed harbors were needed. If the enemy was denied the use of harbors by strong coastal defenses, then his offensive arm was limited to the small numbers of troops he could dispatch amphibiously from the exposed sea.⁵⁸ Military doctrine of the time maintained that these numbers of troops could be readily handled by the small American professional army and the militia. In general this was the strategic defense philosophy adopted by the United States throughout most of the nineteenth century.

From these two criteria it is apparent that some other form of military architecture was required that was more suitable for coastal defense. The answer came from another French military engineer by the name of Marc Rene Marquis de Montalembert. Montalembert was born in 1714, seven years after the death of Vauban. Montalembert entered the French army at the age of eighteen and became an engineer. His experience with combat operations during the Seven Years' War gave him practical experience defending as well as assaulting fortifications constructed along the principles of

⁵⁸ Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911; reprint Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975), 153.

Vauban.⁵⁹ Montalembert criticized certain characteristics of the Vauban style, which was considered a heresy in the French army. Montalembert published an 11-volume work entitled *La Fortification Perpendiculaire* in Paris between 1776 and 1778.⁶⁰ He argued that Vauban's bastioned forts relied too heavily upon the curtain wall that connected the bastions. The curtain wall served little purpose and was dependant upon the bastions and outer works for protection. It also required great numbers of men to defend with little appreciable advantage. Second, he argued that the bastions were designed solely to provide enfilading fire down the face of the curtain wall. This emphasis on short range defense was a poor use of more modern artillery that had developed far greater range. Montalembert argued that artillery should be elevated to make the most of their range and artillery should be placed in positions constructed to maximize firepower by increasing their numbers.

Many of his designs featured fortifications of a circular nature. He argued that circular traces were much more efficient for defense because their decreased perimeter wall length required fewer men to defend. They also permitted artillery fire to sweep a wide arc of territory through the number of guns mounted relatively stationary, rather than by the amount of traverse available to a fewer number of guns. Finally, they were ideal for coastal defense since their smaller perimeter made them more suitable for construction in coastal areas where space was at a premium.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 188.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Willard Robinson, *American Forts; Architectural Form and Function* (Ft. Worth: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 73-74.

In this manner, Montalembert's designs focused on the vertical as opposed to the horizontal traces of Vauban. His designs were analogous to the naval architecture employed in the ships-of-the line of the time. Warships of the period carried their armament on multiple decks and fired through ports in the side of the vessel's hull. Montalembert's design placed artillery in casemates creating multiple floors of artillery. This enabled a single fort to contain many more cannon, (Figure 6) and changed the emphasis on cannon in forts from the degree of traverse, to the range and number of guns. Although Montalembert did not create this theory of casemated fortification he certainly reintroduced it from beneath the heel of Vauban.




Figure 6. This cross section of the walls of Ft. Sumter illustrates the design characteristics associated with casemated fortifications. Courtesy Emanuel Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications of the United States* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993)

ALEXANDER MACOMB AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CASTLE PINCKNEY

As previously mentioned, Jonathan Williams was the individual most responsible for the introduction and spread of Montalembert's theories in America. The most historically intact specimen of Williams' early adaptation of these designs is Castle Pinckney. Although designed by Williams, it was left to another prominent American, Alexander Macomb, to oversee its construction.

Alexander Macomb was one of the first generation of American engineers to come out of West Point. One of the most important American military figures in the early republic, he is best remembered in American history as the commanding general of the United States Army from May 29, 1828 to June 25, 1841.⁶² (Figure 7) Although designed by Jonathan Williams, it was Macomb who actually oversaw the construction of Castle Pinckney and all the other defenses in Charleston Harbor during the second system.⁶³

Macomb was born in Detroit on April 3, 1782.⁶⁴ A British military post at the time, Macomb was from an early age subjected to military matters and form. While still an infant, his family moved to New York where he received an education at the Academy in Newark.

⁶²U.S. Army Center of Military History, United State Army, <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/cg&csa/Macomb-A.htm> (accessed October 3, 2006).

⁶³George Richards, *Memoir of Alexander Macomb the Major General Commanding the Army of the United States*. (New York,: McElrath, Bangs & Co., 1833), 45-48.

⁶⁴Ibid., 14.



Figure 7. Alexander Macomb available online from the United States Army web page at <http://www.army.mil/cmhp/books/cg&csa/Macomb-A.htm>

His military career began on May 28, 1798 when he joined the “New York Rangers” of the 3rd Regiment of New York militia, as a response to the escalating threat from France. Macomb impressed Major General Alexander Hamilton of the northern American Army and was by the young age of seventeen appointed Assistant Adjutant General and attached to General Hamilton. This influence, along with his working relationship with Baron von Steuben, provided the earliest catalyst for the early military mind of Macomb.

Macomb continued serving in the temporarily inflated United States Army. In 1801 he was serving in Philadelphia when he befriended a new major in the Corps of

Artillerists and Engineers and the new Inspector of Fortifications, Jonathan Williams. This fortunate meeting would prove most significant in 1802. As the regular army was being decreased in the face of passive relations with Europe, Macomb's future in the peacetime army was being questioned. Simultaneously, a new and independent Corps of Engineers had been legislatively created with Major Jonathan Williams named as its head. At this fortunate juncture Macomb was recommended as a First Lieutenant in the newly created Corps of Engineers by none other than his old friend, Major Williams.

On June 11, 1805 Macomb had progressed through the transitions of military life and was promoted by Secretary of War Dearborn to the rank of Captain. Macomb was promptly assigned to oversee repairs of the fortifications around Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The following year he was appointed superintendent of public works in South Carolina where it was planned to construct a depot and national armory for the southern states.

This assignment placed Macomb in the right place at the right time for assignment as Chief Engineer of Fortifications for the Carolinas and Georgia. It also resulted in another promotion, this time to major, on February 3, 1808.⁶⁵ He would hold this position until April 28, 1812 when he was called away from his fortification duties to assist Secretary of War Eustis in preparing the United States Army for the war with England.⁶⁶ Macomb's career from this point forward would lead him to serve as the Commanding General of the American Army. For our purpose, it was his time as Chief Engineer of Fortifications for the Carolinas and Georgia that this research will address.

⁶⁵ Richards, *Memoirs of Alexander Macomb*, 47.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

One of Major Macomb's first duties in this new capacity was the immediate fortification of the city of Charleston. Upon his initial arrival in 1807 Macomb was solicited to erect some form of the defense for the city, as the local authorities were afraid for the security of their port because of the dilapidated conditions of the fortifications there.

Two problems immediately appeared that prevented him from taking immediate action. First, Williams had not yet forwarded the designs for the new fortifications, so little could be done in the construction of permanent works. Also, the "Deputy Secretary of the State of South Carolina" had failed to produce a map delineating the exact locations of properties ceded to the federal government for fortification construction.⁶⁷ Without these two documents, Macomb's options were limited.

Instead, Macomb set about constructing a temporary battery at Fort Johnson with sufficient armament to present a respectable defense if needed.⁶⁸ This pacified the city fathers until the approved designs were received and placed in the city in some form of a defensible position.⁶⁹ Macomb's next step was to conduct a survey of the coastline under his charge and begin developing designs and plans for construction at the required locations.

His main focus however remained the port of Charleston. Through his direction, Forts Moultrie and Johnson would be reconstructed and completed. However, the majority of his funds and work would be focused on the creation of Castle Pinckney. It

⁶⁷ *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 206.

⁶⁸ Edwin Bearrs, "Fort Moultrie Number 3: Fort Sumter National Monument Historic Structures Report, Historical Data Section" (Charleston: Fort Sumter National Monument, 1968), 18-19.

⁶⁹ Richards, *Memoirs of Alexander Macomb*, 46.

was under his administrative and technical leadership that the revolutionary design created by Jonathan Williams would begin to take form in Charleston Harbor.

Castle Pinckney exemplified a revolutionary style of military architecture. As explained, American coastal defense construction occurred in three phases between 1794 and the end of the Civil War.⁷⁰ Each series reflected the specific logistical and national level of maturity in existence at the time of implementation. Castle Pinckney was constructed during the second system (1807-1812) of coastal fortifications.⁷¹ It is a salient example of a fortification constructed in this time. Designed by Williams and constructed by Macomb, both native American engineers, it was a pioneer in the use of masonry as the sole building material in construction. As an added component to this, it incorporated a multi-tiered casemated arrangement for its artillery within a circular trace (Figure 8).⁷²

These features embodied a specialized design intended specifically for coastal defense. Traditionally overland fortifications designs were adapted as best as possible to fit coastal defense requirements. The design architecture represented in Castle Pinckney abandoned qualities developed primarily to combat land based infantry assault. Castle Pinckney demonstrated for the first time, attributes which emphasized engagement with naval vessels. These adaptations would become the hallmark form utilized in practically all works in the next generation of American coastal fortifications. These

⁷⁰Edwin C. Bearss, "Coastal Forts of the Southeastern United States", National Park Service http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/forts/forts.pdf. (accessed November 13, 2006), 3-4.

⁷¹Robert S. Browning, *Two If By Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983), 17.

⁷²Lewis, *Seacoast Fortifications*, 37.

forts, constructed in the third system, were one of America's first significant contributions to the evolution of military architecture.




Figure 8. Architectural drawing of Castle Pinckney showing casemate design. Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.

It was this design form that Castle Pinckney embodied. Williams' designs based upon Montalembert's writings found the correct political atmosphere for implementation in the first decade of the nineteenth century. However, circumstances in Charleston and foreign affairs abroad prevented Macomb from immediately employing these revolutionary actions in new fortification construction in early 1807.⁷³ In mid-August

⁷³ *ASP, MA, Vol. 1*, 224 Upon first arriving in Charleston, Macomb was unable to act because the state Legislature did not allocate lands for defense until August. The *Leopard/Chesapeake* Affair had resulted in international tensions between the US and Great Britain the expedited the timely need for defenses to be constructed. Eighth Annual Message, 8 November 1808. *Addresses, Messages and Replies*. Jefferson, Thomas 1743-1826. Charlottesville: (University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library.) 1993, 545 Accessed online at <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/Jefferson> 9/23/05.

Macomb recommended to Secretary of War William Eustis that in the interest of time and money, the defenses of Charleston should be rebuilt instead of beginning new construction. On the site of the original 1798 Fort Pinckney, he recommended an earthen fort to replace the defense constructed there during the Quasi-War with France.⁷⁴ As previously mentioned though, Fort Johnson was the only location to see the construction of temporary works. It was decided that the other sites would wait until the fortification designs arrived from Williams and the proper materials could be procured for construction.

Evidence suggests that work carried out at least at this early stage was done by wage-earning laborers instead of slave labor. In his work chronicling the construction of Fort Moultrie, National Park Service Historian Ed Bearss cites numerous excerpts from letters in the National Archives explaining the use of wage labor in the early 1807 correspondences about Charleston's defenses. The cost of slave labor to Macomb was one dollar and fifty cents per day for each slave plus food rations. Macomb protested this price arguing he could hire one hundred men at a wage of eight to ten dollars a month and get more productive labor from it.⁷⁵ He also argued that in the event of an emergency, these same men could be used to garrison the forts. Macomb was granted the authority to hire his men, but the only temporary works constructed were at Fort Johnson. Later terminology used in Macomb's reports indicate that perhaps he continued some policy of employing wage labor, though at the time of the completion of this thesis primary documentation has not been analyzed to answer this question completely.

⁷⁴ Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 207.

⁷⁵ Bearss, "Fort Moultrie Number 3", 18.

Macomb and South Carolina state officials decided by December 3, 1807 that a strong permanent structure should be constructed on the site of the original Fort Pinckney.⁷⁶ During the next year Macomb worked rapidly toward construction of the new work. By January 6, 1809 Secretary of War Henry Dearborn reported that Castle Pinckney construction had commenced and was in a "rapid state of progression."⁷⁷

As was customary for this design style, the front that faced the water was elliptical in design allowing for guns to sweep a wide arc on the horizon. The landward face was truncated with two small projecting elliptical bastions that provided a small amount of enfilading fire along the rear flank. This arrangement gave the structure an overall horseshoe shape when viewed from above. (Figure 9)

The design allowed for thirty cannon mounted in the casemated tier and en-batterie. The magazine could accommodate two hundred barrels of powder and the barracks could house two hundred officers and enlisted men. (Figure 10) The interior contained the barracks along the gorge wall, cisterns in the two elliptical bastions, and a hot shot furnace. (Figure 11) By December 21, 1809 Secretary of War William Eustis reported that Castle Pinckney was nearly completed.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ *ASP, MA*, Vol. 1, 219.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*




Figure 9. Basic plan of Castle Pinckney showing internal areas and horseshoe shape. Courtesy Wilbur Smith and Associates, *The Economic Feasibility and Development Alternatives for the Castle Pinckney Restoration, Charleston, South Carolina*. (Columbia: Wilbur Smith and Associates, 1978), 52.

During the time work was progressing at Castle Pinckney a similar fortification in New York Harbor was being constructed as well. The name of this fortification was Castle Williams, named after its designer, Jonathan Williams. It has long been heralded that Castle Williams was the first casemated fortification completed in the United States. Careful analysis of the congressional reports calls this observation into question. It is quite possible that such historical attention has been given to Castle Williams because of

its association with Jonathan Williams. The fact that Jonathan Williams was the grandnephew of Benjamin Franklin, the first Superintendent of West Point, the head of the Army Corps of Engineers, and the man most directly responsible for introducing Montalembert's theories on fortification into the country, place his name at the forefront of important Americans in the annals of time. It is only natural that credit for introducing a revolutionary change in coastal defense design would gravitate toward the man with the most historical clout, and subsequently to the structure he directly designed and constructed.




Figure 10. Elevations of Castle Pinckney from 1821 showing arranged casemates and side elevations. Courtesy Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.




Figure 11. Interior view Castle Pinckney in 1861 showing barracks along the gorge wall to the right, hot shot furnace in the foreground, and casemates in the background beginning and extending to the left. Courtesy of Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.

Despite this, cursory evaluations of national records indicate Castle Williams may not have been the first all-masonry casemated fort completed in the United States. According to the reports to Congress, construction on Castle Pinckney progressed more quickly and was probably completed before Castle Williams. According to congressional records, the timeline of the two forts mirrored each other closely. In December 1807 the first reports mentioned the design for the creation of both castles and their proposed locations. The next significant report is dated January 6, 1809. It states that the “new masonry work on the site of old Fort Pinckney is in a rapid state of progress.”⁷⁹ The same report indicated Castle Williams was completed to the second floor and was ready to receive its guns on the first tier.

Throughout the year 1809, work progressed on both forts. By December 19, 1809 it was reported that Castle Pinckney was, “an enclosed work of masonry for two tiers of

⁷⁹ASP, MA, Vol. I, 237.

guns, nearly completed." Whereas Castle Pinckney was nearly completed by this date, the same report lists Castle Williams as, "the lower tier finished, calculated for twenty-six guns, twelve mounted; guns may be placed in the second tier in case of necessity."⁸⁰ By this date Castle Pinckney was obviously more advanced towards completion.

Throughout 1809 work progressed on both fortifications at about the same pace. By December it was reported that both castles were nearly completed. Castle Williams was still unnamed, but it had a projected weapons complement listed, though none had yet been mounted. This report referred to the work in Charleston Harbor as Fort Pinckney, most likely as a hold over from the previous fortification on the site as well as the fact that the nomenclature had not yet caught up with the new design style. It was reported that "Fort" Pinckney was nearly completed for two tiers of artillery. Castle Pinckney was originally intended to house its armament in two casemated tiers, but due to cost overruns Secretary of War Eustis instructed Macomb to complete the work in one tier only, "or at the height to which it may have been already carried."⁸¹ This arrangement is what is extant today.

Congressional records on fortifications from 1810 were burned along with the capital in 1814. However, Macomb was ordered to suspend his work parties in Charleston in March 1810. In response *The Charleston Courier* reported on March 29, 1810 that,

if the works are left in their present state they will soon go to ruin. Thus when our political affairs are involved in perplexity and the dispute with the two great European powers, we are left without means of repelling an attack made upon our city.⁸²

⁸⁰ *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 246.

⁸¹ Wade, "Artillerists and Engineers," 238.

⁸² *The Charleston Courier* (Charleston), 29 March 1810.

Castle Williams was mentioned again on January 18, 1811 in a request for additional funding of eight thousand five hundred dollars to complete the work as originally proposed.⁸³ Castle Pinckney was not mentioned again until December 17, 1811. The December 17 report featured both works, and for the first time referred to Castle Williams by the name which we now know it. The report stated that each castle was completed and listed their logistical capabilities. Obviously if major work on Castle Pinckney ended in March 1810, it is logical to assume it was effectively completed by this date in order to still qualify for the December 1811 remarks.⁸⁴

With these indications it is most likely that Castle Pinckney was completed before Castle Williams. This would make Castle Pinckney the first American designed and completed casemated masonry fortification in the United States. Upon its completion in 1811 it was reported to Congress by Secretary of War Eustis in December as the "most important (fortification) in the harbor."⁸⁵

Macomb's castle in Charleston was a masterpiece of modern engineering when it was completed in 1810. The location of Castle Pinckney and its general size were by products of an age when military technology on the verge of a major surge of development. New technologies allowed for larger cannon to be produced that had greater range and destructive power than before. While regarded as the most important work in the harbor in 1811, by the 1820s the opinion of Castle Pinckney in the military

⁸³ *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 296.

⁸⁴ Once completed, Castle Williams was the larger of the two with fifty two 42-pndrs and 32-pndrs cannons on two tiers, two magazines to hold two hundred fifty barrels of powder, and barracks for three hundred men. Castle Pinckney on the other hand was armed with thirty cannon mounted in two tiers, a magazine for two hundred barrels of powder, and barracks for two hundred men and officers. *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 311.

⁸⁵ *ASP, MA* Vol. I, 311.

world had begun to change and reflect upon the work as of secondary importance. The general evolution of Castle Pinckney during its military life is most important in understanding the way the structure is thought of today.

THE MILITARY LIFE OF CASTLE PINCKNEY

No sooner had Castle Pinckney been completed than developments in technology were acting to alter the role of Castle Pinckney as a defense. At the time Castle Pinckney was constructed armament technology required a large number of cannon, and thereby fortifications, to defend a port. This was largely due to the small size of the artillery, i.e. destructive capability and range of effect. Because of the need for many fortifications at each harbor, numerous coastal defenses were constructed in the interior of harbors, like Castle Pinckney. In the following decades as artillery technology improved and the range of ship-based cannon increased, there became a need to engage hostile ships further out to sea.⁸⁶

This changed the role of Castle Pinckney from a front line defensive structure when it was completed in 1811, to one of a secondary nature by the mid-nineteenth century. It was no longer the salient defensive structure of the harbor, but rather a supporting installation in the interior that was to respond in the event an enemy ship slipped past the first layer of defenses at the mouth of the harbor.

Despite its rather impressive tactical capabilities for the War of 1812, Castle Pinckney saw no action. The southern theatre of British operations anticipated American strategists never materialized. Activity at Castle Pinckney dwindled after the war and saw sporadic garrisoning through 1819.⁸⁷ It was in 1826 when the historical view of Castle

⁸⁶Bearss, "Coastal Forts", 30.

Pinckney began to change. It was first referred to as a work of secondary importance. The site was viewed as merely as "an auxiliary in the defense of the harbor and as serving as a sort of citadel in case of internal commotion," an opinion that would be re-echoed in 1861.⁸⁸

Beginning in 1829, Castle Pinckney received its first new construction since its initial completion prior to the war of 1812. Late in 1828 the Corps of Engineers dispatched Lieutenant Henry Brewerton to Charleston to oversee fortification construction.⁸⁹ In 1829 he recommended the creation of a breakwater to support the foundation and also supervised the general work required to keep the fortification in a serviceable state. By 1831 it was reported that "Castle Pinckney has been thoroughly repaired and is ready to receive its garrison."⁹⁰

It was at this historic juncture that Castle Pinckney witnessed its next period of active use. During the South Carolina Nullification crisis of 1832-1834, Castle Pinckney along with Fort Moultrie, were garrisoned to serve as secure storehouses for valuable United States property in the area if South Carolina was to secede.⁹¹ Castle Pinckney's defenses were enhanced against possible amphibious assault with the construction of a temporary palisade. (Figure 12) The armament was also increased with additional 24-pounder cannon mounted for defense.⁹² It is of interest to note that it was Alexander

⁸⁷ *ASP, MA*, Vol. I, 819.

⁸⁸ *ASP, MA*, Vol. III, 293.

⁸⁹ *ASP, MA*, Vol. IV, 13, 164, 175.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *ASP, MA*, Vol. V, 160.

Macomb, now a Major General serving as Commanding General of the Army, who ordered the reinforcement and defense of Castle Pinckney “to the last extremity.”⁹³ With the conclusion of the nullification crisis a post hospital was constructed in 1835. Despite this addition, the garrison at Castle Pinckney was removed in 1836 to fill manpower requirements during the Second Seminole Indian War.⁹⁴ Castle Pinckney was not re-garrisoned again until the eve of the Civil War in 1860.

Regardless of the lack of a fulltime garrison, activity at Castle Pinckney continued over the proceeding decades. In 1853 Congress appropriated funds for the placement of a navigational light on Castle Pinckney.⁹⁵ One thousand five hundred dollars was allocated for a fifth order Fresnal lens to aid in navigation for the inner harbor. It was subsequently lit on May 15, 1856.⁹⁶ The placement of this light on Castle Pinckney resulted in the additional role of the site as a location for various navigational aids that continued beyond the life of the structure as a fortification.

⁹² *ASP, MA*, Vol. V, 158.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *ASP, MA*, Vol. VI, 167.

⁹⁵ Young, “Castle Pinckney,” 13.

⁹⁶ “Fort Sumter Letter Book,” (Charleston: Walker & Evans, Inc., ca 1880’s; transcribed, Charleston: Fort Sumter National Monument, 2003), 32.




Figure 12. 1846 plat of Castle Pinckney showing outline of bastioned palisade constructed during the nullification crisis and outbuildings. Courtesy of Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.

Another noteworthy event occurred on Castle Pinckney in 1858-9. On August 21, 1858 the navy brig USS *Dolphin* captured an illegal slave ship, the *Echo*, transporting roughly 470 slaves to Cuba. Approximately 140 of the slaves perished during the voyage, but those that did survive were taken to Charleston to have their fate decided.⁹⁷ Eventually the surviving slaves were returned to Africa, but while awaiting their disposition they were housed at Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney. After being housed at Castle Pinckney, Captain J. G. Foster of the Army Corps of Engineers requested in 1859:

authority to apply the sum of one hundred dollars, or less, from the amount of "Contingencies of Fortifications," now in my hands, to defray the expenses of disinfecting, cleaning, whitewashing, & painting the woodwork of the interior, of the Hospital at Castle Pinckney, thus removing all traces of the filth caused by its occupation by the Africans last summer.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ "Detailed Account of the *Echo*" (Charleston: Fort Sumter National Monument research archives, 1996), 1.

⁹⁸ "Fort Sumter Letter Book," 179.

The funds were allocated and those repairs along with subsequent ones were completed by November 24, 1860 when Captain Foster reported to Major Robert Anderson that

Castle Pinckney, which was found in excellent order, with the exception to some repairs required on the wooden banquettes on the gorge, first tier; some new casemate embrasure shutters; and the second cistern to be rebuilt. All other parts of the work are in good order, as it had but recently been repaired thoroughly, with the above exception.⁹⁹

The surviving slaves were eventually resettled to Liberia after a great deal of local and national debate. And as for the crew of the *Echo*, they were taken north, tried, and eventually acquitted of guilt amidst much political discussion.

The activities occurring at Castle Pinckney in the years preceding the Civil War were typical, if not more active, than most other forts along the American maritime frontier. As with most other coastal fortifications, general upkeep and maintenance, with the lack of a military garrison, were the general conditions present that enabled the seceded states to so easily commandeer them and press them into service against the United States Navy. Castle Pinckney was unique from most other forts in that it had participated on a number of historic stages from the Nullification Crisis in the 1830's to the housing of illegal slave contraband that sparked increasing sectionailzation upon the old argument of slavery.

It is ironic that despite its monumental historic presence on the national scene, and its role in the approaching Civil War, Castle Pinckney began to receive its most brutal flurry of negative dialogue about its significance. Beginning on November 11, 1860 the Assistant Adjunct General recommended that although the castle's armament was

⁹⁹Ibid., 262-263.

complete and only a small garrison was required to "secure it against surprise," he "would not recommend its occupation".¹⁰⁰

Just a few weeks later however, on November 23, 1860, this opinion was offered rebuttal from none other than the commander of United States forces in Charleston, Major Robert Anderson. Anderson argued for Castle Pinckney's immediate garrison by federal troops because of its strategic location within the harbor and its close proximity to the city of Charleston itself. He argued that Castle Pinckney and Fort Sumter were the two installations most important in maintaining the control of the harbor.¹⁰¹ As he explained, the guns of Castle Pinckney would be more than adequate to keep Charleston loyal to the Union for fear of bombardment of the city. Anderson even went so far as to argue for the deployment of repairmen at the site if regular troops were not available for garrison there. They could train in secret on use of the guns to secure it against enemy seizure.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, Anderson's plan to garrison Castle Pinckney and secure the loyalty of Charleston through force did not work. South Carolina officially seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860.¹⁰³ Within a week, on December 27, 1860 Castle Pinckney became the first federal installation seized by a seceded state.¹⁰⁴ (Figure 13) The work parties dispatched earlier in the month by Anderson for re-garrisoning and to prevent a

¹⁰⁰ F.J. Porter, Assistant Adjutant-General to Colonel S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, November 11, 1860, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. I*, 72. Hereafter Cited as *O.R.* with appropriate series, volume and page number. Available online from Cornell University at <http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/browse.monographs/waro.html>.

¹⁰¹ *O.R., Series I, Vol. I*, 75.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *O.R., Series I, Vol. I*, 1.

¹⁰⁴ J.G. Foster to R.E. De Russy, December 17, 1860, *O.R., Series I, Vol. I*, 108-109.

surprise seizure were not adequate to defend the structure. The Union garrison on December 27 constituted a lieutenant, an ordnance sergeant, four mechanics, and thirty laborers.



Figure 13. Depiction of South Carolina militia seizing Castle Pinckney 27 December 1860. From the January 12, 1861 *Harper's Weekly*. Accessed online at www.sonofthesouth.net. 11/3/05.

The previous night, December 26, Major Anderson and his garrison of men evacuated Fort Moultrie and moved to the more defensible Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. South Carolina reacted quickly to prevent further occupation of harbor defenses by federal forces. Around noon on December 27, the steamer *Nina* approached Castle Pinckney carrying “a detachment of the First Regiment Rifles, South Carolina Militia, consisting of the Washington Light Infantry, Captain C.H. Simonton, the Carolina Light Infantry, Captain B.G. Pinckney, and the Meagher Guard, Capt. Ed McCrady Jr., under the command of Colonel J.J. Petigrew and Major Ellison Capers”¹⁰⁵ The forces reached

Castle Pinckney around four in the afternoon and the party promptly scaled the walls with ladders. The Union officer in command at Castle Pinckney, Lieutenant Meade, surrendered Castle Pinckney with no loss of blood and he and his men were permitted to join his comrades at Fort Sumter.

This initial seizure of a federal military installation was the first of a rash to sweep through all of the southern states as they followed South Carolina in secession. Besides being the first aggressive act by a southern state upon the sovereignty of the United States, the act also had other far reaching effects. The precedence of seizing these installations provided valuable arms and ammunition to the newly independent states, it furnished them with an effective defensive arm with which the navy-lacking Confederacy could repel Union naval assault, and it denied the Union footholds of power throughout the South.

Despite the precautions Anderson took, Castle Pinckney has the distinction of being the first piece of federal property seized by a seceded state. The bloodless seizure of Castle Pinckney by the South Carolina militia in 1860, constituted the first act of aggression in America's bloodiest war.

Despite the rather significant view of Castle Pinckney in the eyes of Major Anderson, most of the subsequent military men did not think so highly of the structure. Union General Q. A. Gillmore, the engineer in charge of the federal army's siege operations against Charleston and its fortifications, regarded Castle Pinckney as a small lightly-armed work of no appreciable interest. As early as February 1862, Union battle plans for assaulting Charleston Harbor treated Castle Pinckney as a mere distraction after

¹⁰⁵ *O.R., Series I, Vol. I, 109.*

the fall of forts Moultrie and Sumter and describe how easily it would be for two ironclads to render Castle Pinckney ineffectual in defense of the harbor.¹⁰⁶

Confederate opinions of Castle Pinckney early in the war were not much better than their Yankee counterparts. With the exception of General Robert E. Lee's insistence that the garrison of Castle Pinckney not be removed for field deployment, no positive remarks for Castle Pinckney were mentioned in dispatches.¹⁰⁷ The initial Confederate assessment of Castle Pinckney was so poor that its casemates were bricked up, its armament removed, and it served as prison for captured Union soldiers at First Manassas from August until October 1861.¹⁰⁸ (Figure 14)

Perhaps the most scathing evaluation of Castle Pinckney came from P.G.T. Beauregard, overall Confederate commander in Charleston who failed to even tour the site during an engineering inspection. He remarked:

I did not visit Castle Pinckney, the armament of which is nine 24-pounders and one 24-pounder rifled, as I am acquainted already with this work, and considered it nearly worthless, capable of exerting but little influence on the defense of Charleston.¹⁰⁹

This statement, as well as any that can be quoted, sums up the popular military consensus of the effectiveness of Castle Pinckney during the Civil War. In subsequent reports during 1862, General Beauregard did not even mention Castle Pinckney as a factor in the defense of the city and harbor.

¹⁰⁶ General J.G. Barnard, Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac to Major-General George B. McClellan, February 18, 1862, *O.R. Series I*, Vol. VI, 234.

¹⁰⁷ General Robert E. Lee to Governor Francis W. Pickens, South Carolina, December 27, 1861, *O.R., Series I*, Vol. VI, 357.

¹⁰⁸ Lewis, *An Archeological Assessment*, 21.

¹⁰⁹ General P.G.T. Beauregard, September 24, 1862, *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XIV, 610.



Figure 14. View of interior of Castle Pinckney in 1861 as Confederate prison. Note bricked up artillery casemates serving as prison cell. Courtesy of E.P. McClellan Jr., *The Ghosts of Castle Pinckney: A Charlestonian's True Tales of His Boyhood On A Harbor Island*. (Charleston,: Narwhal Press Inc., 1998)

However, events would prove that Castle Pinckney was strategically important to Charleston Harbor for two reasons. First, as a sentinel in the interior of the harbor it helped preserve and protect the interior lines of communication. Second, as the outer defenses became worn down by massive Union bombardment, the inner defenses became more important as key components in a multi-tiered defensive ring protecting Charleston.

The Confederate military began to realize in 1862 the need for a coordinated defense of Charleston Harbor. The strategy for harbor defense revolved around layered

defense of concentric fire directed from various artillery batteries around the harbor. Should Union vessels attempt to enter the harbor, they must first get by a combined assault of the outer defensive works including Fort Sumter, Fort Moultrie, Batter Bee, Battery Beauregard, etc. Vessels trying to navigate the firestorm would also be forced to contend with obstacles in the harbor itself including torpedoes and log booms. If the vessels were able to survive the first ring of artillery fire and obstructions then they would be confronted by the second ring which included mortars from Fort Sumter, and heavy artillery fire from Fort Johnson, Fort Ripley, Battery Bee, the Northwest face of Fort Sumter, and Castle Pinckney. The final defensive ring of fire was comprised of heavy artillery from the battery in Charleston at White Points Garden, Battery Glover, Fort Johnson, Fort Ripley, and Castle Pinckney.¹¹⁰

Working in conjuncture with other sites around the harbor, these interior lines of defense were instrumental in preventing enemy ships from simply running past Sumter and Moultrie and taking up position within the harbor itself. As the Confederate military learned on the Mississippi River in 1862 and in Mobile, Alabama in 1864, naval vessels would simply run past defensive works and proceed to the interior if there was no layered defense to maintain a constant assault. As a cornerstone for the defenses in the interior of the harbor, Castle Pinckney remained strategically vital to the Confederacy as a harbor defense. (Figure 15)

As the Civil War progressed, certain military doctrines were shattered in what became known as the first modern war. One of these was the impunity of masonry coastal defenses. Beginning with Fort Pulaski in 1862, Union artillerymen and engineers

¹¹⁰ *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XIV, 734.

discovered that rifled artillery with its greater range, weight, and conical shaped bullets, were devastating to brick fortifications. As the war progressed, rifled Union artillery battered Fort Sumter in to a shapeless pile of rubble. The Confederates, determined to hold on to there symbol of secession, were forced to convert the fort into a massive earthwork garrisoned with infantry. As the amount of devastation to the outer defenses increased, a better appreciation was had for the inner forts and the role they would play in the defense of the city.




Figure 15. Engineer's drawing showing spatial relationship between Castle Pinckney and other principal forts as well as the interior harbor, 1861. W.A Williams, Sketch of Charleston Harbor, including fortifications, street pattern of Charleston, vegetation, and a few soundings. Courtesy Civil War Map Collection. [Online] Available [HTTP:http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?gmd:1:/temp/~ammem_yDxf](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?gmd:1:/temp/~ammem_yDxf). 10/15/05.

Nowhere is this more evident than the work that began at Castle Pinckney beginning in 1863 and lasted until the end of the war.¹¹¹ Realizing the likelihood that Fort Sumter, and eventually Fort Moultrie, would fall to Union attack, the Confederates began to reevaluate their harbor defenses, with Castle Pinckney as the lynchpin defense in the future plans. The Confederates set about burying the exterior masonry walls with sand and infilling a great deal of the old parade ground. In essence, they converted Castle Pinckney into a massive earthwork impervious to rifled artillery. (Figure 16) The original compliment of thirty guns changed to four much larger guns mounted en barbette and shielded by large earthen traverses.¹¹² (Figure 17) Work continued on Castle Pinckney reinforcing and enhancing it longer than any other Confederate defense in the harbor, a testament to how significant the rebels saw Castle Pinckney.¹¹³

As late as January 1865, the Confederates were expending a great deal of effort sodding the earth around Castle Pinckney and improving the placements of the guns. By this time the fort had been altered, "its casemates were disarmed, its front wall covered with an exterior wall of sand, well sodded, and its ramparts furnished with merlons and traverses."¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XIV, 831.

¹¹² *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XXXV, Part II, 39-41. The armament consisted of three 10" Confederate columbiads and one 7" Brooke's rifle.

¹¹³ *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XLVII, Part II, 152.

¹¹⁴ *O.R., Series I*, Vol. XLVII, Part I, 1009.




Figure 16. The exterior masonry walls have been completely encased with earth to protect from artillery fire. Note the large traverses separating the four cannon to the left, the original barracks' chimneys near the center of the work, and support building to the far right. Courtesy Ft. Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.




Figure 17. This photo shows the interior casemates were covered with earth with four large cannon mounted en-barbette and separated with large earthen traverses. Courtesy Ft. Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files

As fate would have it however, the preparations made by the Confederates' were in vain. With Sherman's march to Columbia, South Carolina, Charleston was nearly surrounded by Union forces. The Confederate defenders were forced to evacuate February 17 and 18, 1865, the garrison of Castle Pinckney included. By the middle of the morning of the 18th Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Bennett, commander of the Twenty-first United States Colored Troops left Fort Sumter "pushed for the city, stopping at Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney, from which works rebel were hauled down and the American flag substituted."¹¹⁵ With this action, Castle Pinckney passed out of the realm as a seacoast fortification. Though the structure would continue to serve in various capacities, it would never again be employed by the United States as an armed defense.

¹¹⁵*O.R., Series I, Vol. XLVII, Part I, 1018-1019.*

POST-BELLUM CASTLE PINCKNEY

After the end of the war opinions resurfaced degrading the historic merits of Castle Pinckney as a military structure. As Thomas Lesesne explained, "War for Southern Independence, it [Castle Pinckney] lacked opportunity to contribute materially to the defense of Charleston."¹¹⁶ Despite its role at the end of the war, the old maxims as exhibited in the writings of Beauregard and the other engineers and its lack of "material" contribution, guided the treatment of Castle Pinckney. It was never regarrisoned and its Civil War armament was left to rot in place and is still in the fort to this day. (Figure 18)

Immediately following the war the site was once again used as a military prison. It housed mostly civilians charged with blockade running and vagrants. Research also indicates that at least twenty-three African-Americans were executed at Castle Pinckney for participating in a mutiny.¹¹⁷ Evidence suggests they were buried on site, perhaps within the in-filled parade ground. Despite a number of verbal accounts of the occasional discovery of exposed burial sites and even medical examinations preformed on the remains, no supporting documentation for this claim has been located.

¹¹⁶Thomas Lesesne, *Landmarks of Charleston*. (Richmond: Garrett & Massie, 1951), 38.

¹¹⁷ Lewis, *An Archeological Assessment*, 29.



Figure 18. Confederate 10" columbiad with muzzle partially exposed inside of fort's infill. Three other large cannon are still in place within the walls but remained buried. Photograph by author.

After its brief stint as a prison, the Corps of Engineers took control of the site and began altering it to make it more functional for their needs. Under the command of its former antagonist, General Gillmore, the interior of Castle Pinckney was filled with dirt and a large storéhouse constructed on top of the old masonry walls.

The next assignment for the structure was as a supply depot for the Lighthouse Board. In 1880, Castle Pinckney was officially transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the Lighthouse Board.¹¹⁸ A light with a 5th order Fresnel lens had been placed on Castle Pinckney as early as 1854, but a new light was installed and the site ceased to be a fortification and became solely an aid to navigation for the inner harbor.¹¹⁹ While under the control of the Lighthouse Board, an impressive two and one half story light-keepers

¹¹⁸ Young, "Castle Pinckney," 60.

¹¹⁹ *An Act making appropriations for Lighthouses, Light boats, buoys, etc. and Providing for the erection and establishment of the same, and for other purposes, Statutes, Vol. X, 340.*

house was constructed that survived until sometime after 1917 when it was replaced with a more modest structure by the Corps of Engineers.¹²⁰ (Figure 19)



Figure 19. Lighthouse keeper's dwelling and support buildings. Courtesy Coast Guard Station Charleston, Archive files.

Castle Pinckney continued to be administered by the Lighthouse Board until 1917, when it reverted back to control of the War Department and continued its service as a supply depot.¹²¹ At some point after this the large light-keepers house was razed and a much smaller one-and-half story four bedroom residence was constructed to house a night watchman and later for inspectors in the Army Corps of Engineers.¹²² (Figure 20)

¹²⁰ Young, "Castle Pinckney," 62.

¹²¹ Ibid, p 64

¹²² E.P. McClellan Jr., *The Ghosts of Castle Pinckney: A Charlestonian's True Tales of His Boyhood On A Harbor Island*. (Charleston,: Narwhal Press Inc., 1998), iv.

This structure, along with a warehouse would stand on Castle Pinckney until destroyed by fire in 1967.



Figure 20. Night Watchman's house and warehouse ca 1930's. Courtesy Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.

In 1924, it looked as though Castle Pinckney's historic relevance was beginning to be appreciated. On October 24, President Calvin Coolidge proclaimed Castle Pinckney a National Monument.¹²³ The explanation for this declaration is most effectively summarized in the whereas clause of the proclamation. It reads,

WHEREAS, there are various military reservations under the control of the Secretary of War which comprise areas of historic and scientific interest;
AND WHEREAS, by section 2 of the Act of Congress approved June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225) the President is authorized "in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall

¹²³ *President Proclamation, Statutes*, Vol. XLIII, part 2, 1968.

be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.¹²⁴

As clearly demonstrated by the legal mandate under which a president could proclaim a site as a National Monument, Castle Pinckney was viewed by the president and the federal government as a site of historic "interest."

Castle Pinckney National Monument remained under the control of the War Department until 1933 when it was transferred to the National Park Service. Although a National Monument and administered by the National Park Service, it continued to be utilized by the Corps of Engineers as a storehouse. Eventually even the National Park Service, the coveted steward of America's cultural and natural resources, fell victim to Castle Pinckney's popular historic interpretation as a mundane site and abolished the site as a National Monument in 1956.¹²⁵ The justification for its demise as a National Monument was explained very clearly in the report submitted to accompany the legislation that legalized the removal of status. As the Assistant Secretary of the Interior explained: "The monument property is in poor physical condition. ... and rehabilitation of the property would be very costly." Despite this fiscal minded objection to its existence as a National Monument, its historic value had to be invalidated in order to resend its status as declared by Presidential Proclamation. It goes on to say,

The fort, although it occupied a position in the defense of Charleston, was never an important link in the system of coastal fortifications. It was not subjected to fire. Consequently, it is not of sufficient historical significance, in our opinion, to warrant its continuance as a national monument.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Ibid. It is ironic that the other four sites included in this same proclamation (Ft. Wood, Ft. Pulaski, Ft. Marion, and Ft. Matanzas) were all fortifications as well and are still interpreted as National Monuments, with only Ft. Pulaski and Ft. Marion being the only two to ever come under direct assault.

¹²⁵ *An Act to Abolish the Castle Pinckney National Monument in the state of South Carolina, Statutes, Vol. LXX, part 1, 61.*

¹²⁶ Ibid.

on was, however, a fabricated bureaucratic rational exploiting incomplete and historical interpretation of Castle Pinckney. As can be seen, the old maxim of its limited value because of its lack of trial by fire, provided the necessary fodder to support its demise based upon financial concerns.

With the demise of Castle Pinckney as a National Monument in 1956 the property became available for new ownership. It was temporarily held as surplus property by the General Services Administration (GSA) of the federal government. On February 26, 1958 the South Carolina States Port Authority purchased Castle Pinckney, and the small amount of Shutes Folly deeded with it, for \$12,000 from the GSA.¹²⁷ The Ports Authority explored the option of restoring and developing the site but found it too costly and offered to return it to the ownership of the National Park Service. The Park Service promptly refused the offer on much the same grounds under which they relinquished control originally.

Between 1964 and 1965 the Ports Authority deeded the site to the South Carolina Shriners organization for use as a retreat for crippled children. This venture also failed due to lack of funding and the site once again reverted back to Port control. A change did occur in the appearance of the fort in 1967 when a mysterious fire destroyed the ca. 1917 Corps of Engineers residence and storage warehouse.¹²⁸ Castle Pinckney remained under the ownership of the Ports Authority until 1968 with the Sons of Confederate Veterans, (SCV) Fort Sumter Camp 1209 acquired the property for a Confederate Memorial.

¹²⁷Fort Sumter National Monument Administrative Record File, "United States Legislative and Administrative History-Castle Pinckney" (Charleston: Fort Sumter National Monument Administrative Record File).

¹²⁸ *A Chronology of Castle Pinckney*, South Carolina Sate Ports Authority, at <http://www.port-of-charleston.com/community/history1.sap>. (accessed October 10, 2006).

Castle Pinckney remained under the ownership of the SCV from 1968 until 1984. Through their efforts, an archeological assessment was completed as was a restoration and rehabilitation plan for possible uses of the site. As happened so many times before, funds for the project ran dry and it eventually fell back under the jurisdiction of the State Ports Authority where it remains to this day. (Figures 21, 22, & 23)




Figure 21. Contemporary view of Castle Pinckney's gorge wall and sally port. Photograph by author.




Figure 22. Original 1809 masonry casemate being exposed from burial since 1864. Photograph by author.



Figure 23. Sea facing elliptical wall. Photograph by author.

CONCLUSION

So it is here where the story of Castle Pinckney brings us. As it begins to approach its 200th anniversary of construction one cannot help but ask why this bastion of American resolve is relatively ignored. Its creation was spawned by the threat of European belligerency at a time when the United States was still unsure of its ability to sustain independence through force. Its design was the brain child of Jonathan Williams, America's first leader in theoretical military architecture. Likewise, the labor implementing the design was supervised by Alexander Macomb, another first generation American military engineer who would go on to head the Army of the United States.

Through association with famous Americans alone, Castle Pinckney is nationally unique. When one takes into consideration the architecture employed in its construction its significance continues to escalate. The transition away from more traditional fortification designs exhibited the American need and ability to create their own form defenses suited to the specific environments in the United States. The all masonry casemated elliptical form of Castle Pinckney functioned as the prototype of American seacoast fortification design from 1816 through the American Civil War.

Beyond its tangible rarity is of course the history surrounding the place. Castle Pinckney has played a role in events that have shaped and molded this nation. From its intended role in the Nullification crisis, to its use as a temporary residence for African slaves, to its role as the site of the first overt act of aggression of the Civil War, Castle Pinckney remains highly significant.

Of course all of the factors serve merely as reflections, or specific examples, of the greater historic theme represented by Castle Pinckney. That is of course the maturation of the United States as a new political and evolving state in the annals of time. As Carl von Clausewitz explained, "War is the continuation of policy by other means."¹²⁹ It is not just enough to create a state based upon ideology and constitutions guaranteeing representative governments. Those ideals and policies must have a tangible form capable of enforcing and/or defending those prescribed notions. This option of force whether defensive or offensive in nature, is just as significant in securing nation status as the academic ratification of governmental documents. For if the physical means of enforcement do not exist, then a government exists only so long as it is not contested by others who do have the means to enforce will.

As much as anything, Castle Pinckney stands as a monument to the efforts of the young republic to secure its boundaries and defend itself from hostile foreign governments. This greater theme of the United States, undertaking the creation of a national means of projecting the will of body politic in a physical manner, is what the construction and life of Castle Pinckney truly reflects. The other factors of specific historic events, architectural form, and association with historically prominent Americans are specific examples of what mechanisms developed as a result of this theme. It is only through this view shed that the true significance of Castle Pinckney becomes apparent. As Castle Pinckney rests silently in the shadow of the new Cooper River Bridge, one cannot help but wonder how much longer it will be before the children of the new

¹²⁹Carl Von Clausewitz *On War* (Reprint of 1832 original; New York: Random House Inc., 1943) 16-17.

millennia will shake off the old traditions of the past and see the old worn brick walls for what they truly are.



Figure 24. Quiet reflection outside of old Castle Pinckney after the end of hostilities. Courtesy of Fort Sumter National Monument Archival Flat Files.

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